Inside The Proxy Battle That Keeps An Iraqi City On Its Knees

Central to such efforts in Nineveh, these sources said, were two powerful Sunnis - Khamis al-Khanjar, an Anbar businessman turned politician, and Ahmed al-Jabouri, widely known as Abu Mazen, a former governor of Salahuddin province, now sitting in the Iraqi parliament.

Khanjar was an outspoken opponent of Iran. He supported Sunni protests against the Iran-backed Baghdad government in 2013 and later accused Iran-allied Shi’ite militias of human rights abuses. Abu Mazen was once a U.S. Ally. He described working closely with U.S. Forces after the 2003 invasion.

In 2018, Khanjar and Abu Mazen unexpectedly joined a bloc of Iran-backed parties and militia leaders in the Iraqi parliament. Explaining this shift, Khanjar said: “The strongest on the ground can get things done … I go with the bloc that’s (strongest) on the ground. If that coalition has Iranian links, that’s not on us.” He denied being an ally of Iran. Abu Mazen declined to comment for this article.

Then, in May 2019, Khanjar and Abu Mazen intervened in the selection of Nineveh’s new governor, according to nine sources, including several members of the regional administrative council and relatives of the two men. A majority of Nineveh’s 39 councilors, tasked with electing the new governor, initially favoured a candidate critical of Iran, these sources said. But two days before the council was due to vote, Abu Mazen and Khanjar invited nearly two dozen council members to a meeting in a hotel in nearby Erbil, said several people, one of whom attended.

The council members were promised local government posts or payments of up to $300,000 apiece from the men or their offices if they voted for a different candidate, Mansour al-Mareid, a Sunni favoured by Iran and its allies in Baghdad, these people said. One council member told Reuters he accepted money and used it to buy a new home.

Mareid was duly elected with the votes of 28 of the 39 council members.

Khanjar confirmed he and Abu Mazen met with councilors in Erbil to agree on the governor and negotiate over provincial posts. He also confirmed he supported Mareid, but denied that votes were bought. “I didn’t pay a single dinar,” he said.

Mareid, the winning candidate, said he had no knowledge of bribes being given to councilors and he denied any loyalty to Iran, but he added: “Council members can be bought, so it wouldn’t surprise me, and nothing can happen in this country without Iran approving it.”

The gathering in Erbil wasn’t the only meeting that took place around that time. Three of the councilors interviewed by Reuters described further meetings and contacts with senior Iraqi paramilitary officials who were trying to win support for Mareid.

Another Nineveh councilor recounted that he and a colleague were invited to a hotel in Baghdad shortly after the vote to meet a senior Iranian diplomat and an Iraqi militia leader loyal to Iran. The councilor, who had loudly criticized Mareid’s appointment, said he was offered a post in the Nineveh government if he would drop his opposition to the new governor. He said he declined the offer. The Iranian embassy didn’t reply to questions about the meeting. Reuters couldn’t reach the militia leader. The Iraqi state paramilitary Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) that oversees militias didn’t respond.

U.S. Pushes back

Within a few months the pendulum had swung again.

The United States imposed sanctions on Iran-aligned militia leaders and on their Iraqi Sunni allies – among them Abu Mazen in July and Khanjar in December.

The U.S. Treasury said it was freezing Abu Mazen’s assets because he had protected “his personal interests by accommodating Iran-backed proxies that operate outside of state control.” It targeted Khanjar in a round of sanctions against Iran-backed militia leaders, accusing him of bribery and saying he had spent “millions of dollars in payments to Iraqi political figures in order to secure their support.”

Abu Mazen and Khanjar denied any wrongdoing at the time and condemned the U.S. Sanctions as interference in Iraq’s internal affairs.

Abu Mazen felt under pressure as a result of the U.S. Move, said a relative and five Nineveh councilors. The measures helped persuade Abu Mazen, these sources said, to withdraw support for Mareid and back a former military commander and U.S. Ally, Najm al-Jabouri [no relation], to replace him as governor. In November, 23 of the council’s 39 members voted to dismiss Mareid and appoint Jabouri.

Jabouri’s appointment and the pressure on Iran’s allies across the country from U.S. Air strikes and sanctions have given militia groups pause in Mosul, local officials say. Their military presence has reduced on inner city streets where Shi’ite and militia flags once flew atop mosques and junkyards they controlled.

Pro-U.S. Officials in Mosul hope that the government of Prime Minister Kadhimi, who is accepted by both the United States and Iran, together with fractures among Iran-backed militias following the death of Soleimani, will turn the tide against Tehran’s influence. But they also complain that Governor Jabouri is mostly hamstrung against Iran’s militia and political allies in Mosul.

“Jabouri is weak politically,” said Mosul council member Ali Khdeir. “Because of their power on the ground, he’ll have to deal carefully with the militias at first.”

Jabouri told Reuters that any governor would face criticism and he defended his record. He conceded that political rivalries were impeding progress in rebuilding the city. “It makes my work harder,” he said.

Four local officials said some administrative posts have changed hands and are no longer controlled by allies of Iran-backed militias, but others are still held by officials with links to militia groups. The militias also have offices in Mosul, these local officials said, through which they win construction and other business contracts, even though such offices were banned by a central government decree last year. The militia groups did not respond to Reuters questions about their activities.

A city in ruins

Amid this chaos, reconstruction stalls.

The power vacuum between Mareid and Jabouri just weeks before the end of 2019 prevented contracts being awarded at a crucial time when the annual budget needed to be spent, a senior local administrator and a second official said.

A document signed by the head of municipalities, Abdul Qadir al-Dakhil, and reviewed by Reuters showed that provincial authorities failed to award contracts worth more than $200 million in Nineveh province in 2019. They included the new emergency hospital, equipment for another nearby hospital, providing additional vehicles for the civil defence rescue services and rehabilitating 13 schools, Dakhil told Reuters.

Dr Omar Hamudat, who helps run the West Mosul emergency medical complex, worked in Mosul hospitals under international sanctions in the 1990s and under Islamic State’s occupation. Hamudat said healthcare infrastructure was the worst it had ever been.

Proxy Servers 24 secure web proxy

Main menu

Pages

Inside The Proxy Battle That Keeps An Iraqi City On Its Knees